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89 
Legal Education as a Private Good 
Steven L. Willborn  
In the spring of 2004, Stewart Schwab and I were preparing for 
upcoming meetings of our alumni advisory boards. As something to 
discuss, we decided to calculate the long-term financial returns from 
an education at our two law schools. (It is not always easy to come up 
with topics for alumni boards.) We did this in a reasonable and 
efficient way—it was not econometrics nor was it quite back-of-the-
envelope. We used conservative numbers for lost wages and expected 
future income, we put in our current tuition levels,
1
 and we factored 
in a couple other things, like inflation. When we ran the numbers, we 
found that at both schools the investment in a legal education was a 
wonderful one. At Nebraska, students came out more than $1.5 
million ahead in lifetime earnings. My recollection was that the 
benefit was even greater at Cornell.
2
 
Stewart and I had different reactions to these delightful results, 
and it is those different reactions that I want to discuss briefly. 
Stewart saw the result and said “Shouldn’t we be charging a lot 
more?” The analogy here would be to the stock market or the pricing 
of any asset. An efficient market would price the asset (here a legal 
education) at the present value of the extra future earnings one would 
 
  Judge Harry A. Spencer Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. 
Thanks to Eric Berger, Richard Moberly, Jerry Organ, Stewart Schwab, and Emily Willborn for 
comments on early drafts. 
 1. At the time, tuition and fees at Nebraska were about $7,000 annually for residents and 
about double that for non-residents. This year tuition and fees at Nebraska for first-year law 
students are $14,363 for residents and $31,045 for non-residents. Financing Your Education, 
UNIV. OF NEB. COLL. OF LAW, http://law.unl.edu/prospective/financing.shtml (last visited Jan. 
8, 2013). These are fairly typical increases. From 2004 to 2011, average public resident, public 
non-resident, and private law school tuition increased by 86 percent, 59 percent, and 45 percent, 
respectively. Jerome M. Organ, Reflections on the Decreasing Affordability of Legal Education, 
41 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 33, 34 35 (2013). 
 2. I could not find records of that half of the analysis in my files. 
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expect from that asset.
3
 Our little study showed that both our law 
schools were charging much less than efficient market rates. In effect, 
we were giving each student a gift worth more than $1 million.
4
 
My initial reaction was subtly different. My reaction was “Why 
are we charging so little?,” not with the implication that we should be 
charging more, but instead to ask why schools (and governments) 
provided the support needed to maintain such a low price. The 
analogy here would be to our nation’s general approach to education 
where the notion has traditionally been that it provides public benefits 
as well as private ones and, as a result, should be subsidized. 
There is no doubt that the Schwab perspective
5
 is the current, 
modern approach to legal education. One of the factors leading to our 
current crisis (and this conference) is the broad shift from a world in 
which education, including legal education, was viewed as a quasi-
public good to a world in which it is viewed primarily as a private 
good. The traditional public-goods view of education was especially 
pronounced at the elementary and secondary levels, where education 
was thought to contribute to democracy and an informed electorate, 
as well as to a more productive nation.
6
 But it was also true for higher 
education. Many well-known higher education programs were based, 
implicitly or explicitly, on a public-goods rationale, such as the land 
grant movement after the Civil War, the G.I. bill and expansion of 
community colleges after World War II, and the large public 
investments in science and technology education after Sputnik. Even 
the organizational structure of higher education—through public and 
nonprofit entities—signaled its public-goods nature. The general 
 
 3. Somewhat more precisely, the price would be set at the present discounted value of 
the future increase in expected earnings, where the expected earnings are adjusted by the 
undiversifiable risk associated with a law degree. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: 
Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 968–75 (1991) 
(describing fundamental market efficiency in pricing stocks). See generally JOHN H. 
COCHRANE, ASSET PRICING (rev. ed. 2005). 
 4. Again, somewhat more precisely, on average, we were giving each of our students a 
large gift. The results for individual students, of course, varied considerably, but with the size of 
the gift, all but a few were likely to come out well ahead of the cost of their investment. 
 5. I should be clear that the “Schwab perspective” is my shorthand for describing a 
private-goods, market-based approach to legal education based on an off-hand comment 
Stewart Schwab made years ago. I am not purporting to describe Stewart’s actual views. 
 6. For an early and influential exploration of this, see JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND 
EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (1916). 
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view was that there were huge public benefits from an educated 
populace, so the public should provide subsidies to ensure wide 
access and affordability.
7
 
But in the past few decades, a number of factors have converged 
to shift that general conception.
8
 The movement was fed by academic 
studies that focused on education as an investment in individual 
human capital,
9
 that measured increasingly large returns to 
individuals from higher education,
10
 and that criticized public 
subsidies on various grounds.
11
 These kinds of ideas resulted in real 
changes on the ground. State appropriations for public universities 
declined.
12
 Tuition costs went up dramatically.
13
 Private for-profit 
companies began to be major players in higher education.
14
 
Traditional universities increasingly moved to market-based tuition 
rates, for example, charging more for engineering and business 
majors than for majors in the humanities.
15
 Law schools were among 
 
 7. For a good, brief review of this history, see Brian Pusser, Higher Education, the 
Emerging Market, and the Public Good, in THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY AND POSTSECONDARY 
EDUCATION (Patricia Albjerg Graham & Nevzer G. Stacey eds., 2002). 
 8. It is hard to know how big to draw the circle. I describe the shift in education 
generally and in higher education, but it could also be viewed as one part of an even broader 
shift towards privatization in society generally. For one description of this phenomenon, see 
Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1377–94 (2003). 
 9. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 17–21 (3d ed. 1993); MILTON 
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85–107 (1962). 
 10. For good recent reviews, see Michael Hout, Social & Economic Returns to College 
Education in the United States, 38 ANN. REV. SOC. 379 (2012); see also CLAUDIA GOLDIN & 
LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY (2008). 
 11. For example, public subsidies for education have been criticized because many of the 
benefits flow to those who do not need them, HOWARD BOWEN, INVESTMENTS IN LEARNING: 
THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL VALUE OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (1977), and because 
they inhibit market-based reform in higher education. See Pusser, supra note 7, at 109–10. 
 12. See STATE HIGHER EDUC. EXEC. OFFICERS, STATE HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCE FY 
2010, at 33, tbl 7 (2011) (showing a one-year decline in state revenues per FTE of 3.2 percent 
between 2009 and 2010 and a five-year increase of only 3.3 percent between 2005 and 2010). 
 13. See Hout, supra note 10, at 386 (reporting that the average cost of attending a public 
four-year college or university increased 125 percent between 1981 and 2009). 
 14. See Scott Jaschik, The Growth of For-Profits, INSIDEHIGHERED.COM (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/01/18/carnegie_releases_revised_classifications_of_ 
colleges_and_universities (reporting that for-profit colleges increased their student population 
by one million students between 2005 and 2010 and increased their share of all college students 
from 5.1 percent to 9.1 percent). 
 15. See Scott Jaschik, The Rise of Differential Tuition, INSIDEHIGHERED.COM (Feb. 21, 
2012), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/02/21/study-finds-increasing-numbers-public 
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the most active in pushing this trend in the academy. Increasingly, 
they began to give up state funding in return for the ability to charge 
market rates and keep the proceeds.
16
 More specifically for our topic, 
viewing education as a private good carries with it the notion that the 
product should be priced appropriately. No more big gifts to students; 
instead “fair” pricing given the expected returns; hence, higher 
tuition, lower contributions from public coffers, and no more sure 
bets that the investment will pay off. 
I expect I am like many of you in thinking that the public-goods 
view is closer to the correct view. I view much that has been written 
about our current situation as a yearning to return to that old world. 
But I am also a realist. I am quite sure we will never return to that 
world. When one accepts the new world with a legal education 
viewed as a private good, the current state of affairs can begin to look 
pretty normal. A new normal, to be sure, and one we may wish we 
were not in. But, frankly, in this new world, the current prices look 
about right, and the market seems to be working to force adjustments 
about as one would expect.
17
 This view of the world reveals no major 
villains in the story, not the ABA, not greedy law professors, not 
dishonest career-services officers, no one.
18
 Nor does it promise great 
prospects for the grand solutions that are being offered.
19
 
This short Article is intended to be positive, not normative; it is an 
exploration of the current situation viewed through a particular lens.
20
 
Through that lens, the Article is intended to be a clear-eyed 
description of where we are. The current situation presents serious 
problems of affordability and accessibility. In the long run, society 
will suffer from these problems; it will suffer doubly because certain 
 
-colleges-differential-tuition (reporting that a majority of flagship universities now have 
differential tuition rates). 
 16. See Denis Binder, The Changing Paradigm in Public Legal Education, 8 LOY. J. PUB. 
INT. L. 1 (2006). 
 17. See infra notes 22–43 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 20. I should be clear that I am not sure that this lens is the best one for viewing our current 
situation. There are certainly other lenses that provide insight into our current situation, such as 
the evolving market for lawyers. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, The Job Gap, the Money 
Gap, and the Responsibility of Legal Educators, 41 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2013). But I do 
believe that an exploration of this particular lens contributes to the current debate. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/5
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demographic groups will lose access disproportionately. Again, I 
would prefer the old world where it was recognized that education 
generally and legal education in particular provided important public 
goods and where society acted to ensure that those public goods 
continued to be provided. But I do not see a path back to that world. 
Thus, this Article is not about that world, but about the world in 
which we find ourselves. 
Let us begin by considering law school pricing in a world where a 
legal education is purely a private good. First, as I mentioned above, 
when viewed as a capital asset, the most a law student should be 
willing to pay for a legal education would be the present discounted 
value of the increase in expected earnings from a law degree.
21
 There 
have been several studies along these lines, and the evidence is mixed 
about whether the current cost of a legal education is “worth it” in 
this sense. Professor Schlunk, who has probably done the most 
careful analysis, concludes that a legal education pays off for about 
31 percent of average students, 21 percent of good students, and 31 
percent of exceptional students.
22
 But he skews the analysis against 
profitability in a number of ways, such as considering only private 
school tuition, assuming no scholarships, and assigning a discount 
rate of 12 percent. With more generous (or realistic?) assumptions, 
his analysis may well have resulted in a net financial surplus from a 
legal education for the average student. Professor Organ’s analysis in 
this volume accounts for some of these shortcomings, for example, 
by taking scholarships into account.
23
 He finds that law school is 
worth it (results in at least marginal financial viability) for about 46 
percent of all Class of 2011 graduates and for at least 70 percent of 
2011 graduates at about one-quarter of all law schools. This analysis 
takes scholarships into account, so Professor Organ’s estimates are 
 
 21. As those who jump into these waters always caution, this is an extremely difficult 
calculus and is highly particular to each individual student’s circumstances. See, e.g., Herwig 
Schlunk, Mamas 2011: Is a Law Degree a Good Investment Today?, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 301, 
327 (2012) (it is “worth repeating again and again that each potential student’s calculus will be 
based on a host of factors unique to him or her”). 
 22. Id. at 323. Professor Schlunk refers to these three categories as “also ran,” “solid 
performer,” and “hot prospect.” 
 23. See Organ, supra note 1, at 47–49. 
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probably closer to the mark than Professor Schlunk’s.24 Nevertheless, 
his analysis also contains elements that may skew it against 
profitability, so the actual numbers may be somewhat better than 
this.
25
  
This evidence seems to support the idea that the current price of a 
legal education is about right when viewed as a private good that 
produces an expected increase in future earnings. Or, at least, the 
evidence is not inconsistent with this view; it does not provide 
conclusive evidence that current pricing is out-of-step with the 
expected returns from a legal education.
26
 Certainly, it’s not the 
world Stewart and I were exploring several years ago where every 
student was almost guaranteed a good return on her investment. But 
that is not the modern, private-goods world. Today, the evidence 
seems consistent with the average student coming out ahead on her 
investment. Students, of course, experience a wide range of returns 
on investments created by differences on both sides of the equation, 
that is, both because some students incur relatively low law school 
 
 24. To be clear, Professor Organ is not engaging in the same type of analysis as Professor 
Schlunk. Borrowing from Professor Chen, Professor Organ is basically examining whether 
student debt levels would preclude them from qualifying for a home loan. See Jim Chen, A 
Degree of Practical Wisdom: The Ratio of Educational Debt to Income as a Basic 
Measurement of Law School Graduates’ Economic Viability, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1185, 
1201 (2012) (“[p]erhaps the best way of assessing law school affordability is to gauge the ease 
(or difficulty) with which a young lawyer can simultaneously defray educational debt and buy a 
house”). 
 25. For example, Professor Organ uses 2010–11 tuition to estimate tuition for 2011 
graduates even though that would be higher than the average tuition paid by those graduates. 
Because tuition has been increasing so rapidly, if he had used 2009 resident tuition levels 
instead, as he discussed doing, the tuition would have been 20 percent lower at public schools 
and 10 percent lower at private schools. Organ, supra note 1, at 45 n.21. Similarly, his analysis 
incorporates Professor Chen’s estimate of total law school debt as three times tuition. Chen, 
supra note 24, at 1203. Professor Chen provides no support for that estimate. My own 
comparison of debt levels of 2011 graduates at a random sample of one-third of all law schools 
indicates that Professor Chen’s estimate was 16 percent too high. The ratio of debt to tuition 
was 2.58, not 3.00. To be fair, there are also elements of Professor Organ’s analysis that might 
skew his number in favor of profitability. For example, his analysis uses resident tuition rates 
for public schools and does not include undergraduate debts. It is impossible to know how these 
cross-cutting elements balance off against each other. I think Professor Organ makes defensible 
choices and commend him for his efforts. But at the same time, he embarked on a difficult task 
and his estimates must be treated with caution. 
 26. This is especially true given the additional evidence that law school pricing is in the 
process of adjusting to changing market conditions. See infra notes 33–36 and accompanying 
text. 
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costs and debts and because, given the weird bimodal distribution of 
salaries,
27
 some students do much better than average in future 
returns. Sometimes, students benefit from both sides of the equation; 
sometimes they get hurt on both sides. But that is also true in other 
capital markets. Some investors do very well in the stock market, 
others not so much. It is well known, for example, that individual 
investors tend to underperform, in part, because of optimism bias.
28
 
In the law school market, one would expect optimism bias to support 
higher than strictly optimum tuition levels. That is, students overly 
optimistic about their prospects of doing very well in law school 
would be willing to pay more than a strict clear-eyed accounting of 
discounted future returns would justify. This would imply that the 
percentage of students for whom the investment actually pays off 
would be less than 50 percent. This would align law school costs and 
returns with the experience in other capital markets where most 
investors do not succeed. Viewed in this way, the success rate we 
might expect on a law school investment after accounting for 
optimism bias would be about at or a bit lower than the reported 
success rate of 46 percent at all law schools and quite a bit lower than 
the reported 70 percent success rate at about one-quarter of all law 
schools.
29
 Again, this implies that the current cost of law school is not 
too high; indeed, there may yet be room for increases at some places. 
But, of course, law school tuition need not be set to absorb all of 
the increase in discounted earnings expected from a legal education. 
The discounted future earnings are the maximum one would expect 
law students to be willing to pay, but competition between schools 
may reduce the level. If Law Schools A and B can both produce 
$50,000 in discounted expected future earnings at a cost of $40,000, 
Law School A might decide to charge only $45,000. School A could 
steal all the students away from School B that way and still come out 
 
 27. Salary Distribution Curve (2012), NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR LAW PLACEMENT, 
available at www.nalp.org/salarydisrib (last visited Jan. 8, 2013) (showing that few 2011 law 
graduates received the adjusted mean starting salary of $73,984; instead, graduates clustered at 
points above and below the average with about 52 percent receiving between $40,000 and 
$65,000 and 14 percent receiving $160,000). 
 28. BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 219–22, 238–40 
(2007). 
 29. See Organ, supra note 1, at 49. 
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ahead.
30
 But, of course, School A cannot steal all the students away 
from School B. School A has limited capacity and, even today after a 
20 percent decline in applicants from a decade ago, the number of 
applicants to ABA law schools exceeds the number of seats by 
30,000.
31
 School B will be able to fill its seats. But there’s another 
important competition between the two schools thanks in part to US 
News (yes, thanks). School A and School B are both interested in 
attracting the best students—based especially on LSAT scores and 
undergraduate GPAs, but more broadly than that. If School A offers 
lower tuition, it may be able to steal all the best students away from 
School B.
32
 Thus, if the private-goods market is working properly, 
competition like this between schools may be holding law school 
costs below the maximum that students might be willing to pay. This 
would help to explain why there’s still a long queue of students who 
want to attend law school. 
So far, then, if we view the new world of law schools as a market 
for a private good, we seem to have a fairly well-functioning 
market.
33
 The price for a legal education seems rationally related to 
the expected discounted future returns. Competition between law 
schools may be reducing that amount below the maximum that 
students might be willing to pay, which produces excess demand and 
better-than-expected odds of a positive return on the investment. 
Other, more recent evidence also seems consistent with a decently 
functioning market. When the number of law student applications 
started to decline, law schools began to reduce their class sizes. First-
year law school enrollment dropped more than 7 percent from 2010 
to 2011 to its lowest level since 2005,
34
 even though the number of 
 
 30. Thanks to Stewart Schwab for reminding me of this point. 
 31. LSAC Volume Summary, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://www.lsac.org/ 
lsacresources/data/lsac-volume-summary.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2013). 
 32. Tuition pricing, of course, is a very complicated topic. Schools are not and should not 
be viewed as perfect substitutes for one another; different tuition levels may merely reflect 
differences in actual or perceived school quality. Similarly, the tuition level itself may be one 
way in which a school signals quality. For a seminal article on this topic, see Paul Milgrom & 
John Roberts, Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1986). 
 33. Or again, more modestly, we do not have strong evidence that the market is wildly out 
of kilter. 
 34. See LSAC Volume Summary, supra note 31. These are the latest figures publically 
available. An informal survey of Midwestern law schools for the 2011 entering class confirms 
these reductions in matriculants. In this survey of eighteen schools, only one reported an 
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law schools has increased.
35
 This evidence is consistent with normal 
market adjustments. Similarly, although tuition levels have gone up 
in recent years, grants and scholarships are going up even faster as 
schools compete more vigorously for students.
36
 Again, this 
moderation in net price increases is what one would expect in a 
market adjusting to reduced demand. 
The broad argument here is that a major contributing factor to the 
current turmoil in legal education is the broad social shift in the 
conception of education generally, including legal education. The 
shift is from viewing education as a public good justifying subsidies 
to viewing it as a private good paid for by the consumer without 
subsidies. This shift alone would have created tensions and problems 
with affordability and accessibility, but these problems were 
exacerbated in recent years by the economic downturn.
37
 
If true, this perspective has implications for claims that have been 
made about who is responsible for the current state of affairs. The 
perspective tends to diffuse blame and point away from a strong role 
for those most often accused of responsibility (or even perfidy). The 
current state of legal education is part of a broader societal trend. 
 
increase in matriculants between the entering classes of 2010 and 2011 (an increase of 2.7 
percent); all the rest reported decreases ranging from 2.4 percent to 19.3 percent. Professor 
Organ told me that the number of seats declined another 8 percent from 2011 to 2012. 
 35. One new law school was provisionally approved in 2011 and two more were 
provisionally approved in 2012. Ten new law schools have been approved since 2006. ABA-
Approved Law Schools by Year, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_ 
education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools/by_year_approved.html (last visited Jan. 8, 
2013).  
 36. In 2011, tuition and fees for public school resident students increased by an average of 
9 percent, while grants and scholarships increased by 15 percent. In the five-year period ending 
in 2011, tuition and fees increased by an average of 55 percent; grants and scholarships 
increased by 76 percent. Law School Tuition 1985–2011, AM. BAR ASS’N 1, http://www.amer 
icanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/
ls_tuition.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2013); Internal Grants and Scholarships 1991–
2011, AM. BAR ASS’N 1, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_ 
education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/internal_grants_scholarships_awarded.authcheck 
dam.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2013). See also Chelsea Phipps, More Law Schools Haggle on 
Scholarships, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2012 (reporting on increased willingness of law schools to 
grant generous scholarships). 
 37. I do not mean to imply here that shifts in the legal market documented by Bill 
Henderson and others have not also played a major role in the disruptions we are seeing. But I 
do claim that those shifts would be less disruptive if they were not occurring at the same time as 
the more basic shift in perspective that I describe here. 
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Thus, the ABA’s rules and regulations are mere bit players in the 
drama. They may increase costs some, and they may even increase 
costs by more than the benefits they produce in ensuring well-
prepared lawyers. But the costs would have gone up anyway given 
the broad societal shifts affecting education generally; the marginal 
effect of ABA rules was probably very small.
38
 Law professors may 
be “greedy,” but the main reason their compensation has gone up has 
probably not been because there was room to charge law students 
more, but because the compensation in the markets they tend to come 
from has gone up even more dramatically.
39
 To compete in that 
market (and in the competitive market between law schools), law 
professor compensation was destined to go up. If legal education was 
still viewed as a public good rather than a private one, those extra 
costs would have been distributed in a different way. But in a private-
goods world, law students are the ones who should pay for that high-
quality labor. Intentionally misleading placement data may have 
fooled law students into paying “too much” for their legal educations. 
No doubt there were bad actors here, but claiming they have had an 
important effect on the whole legal education market is a much 
broader allegation. With all the information in the blogosphere today 
about the job prospects facing law school graduates, it would be hard 
now to claim that prospective law students are unknowing 
consumers. And yet, even with this better information, there were 
49,000 first-year seats in ABA law schools last year, and 79,000 
people who wanted to fill them.
40
 
I cannot repeat too often that this is intended to be a clear-eyed 
view, not a dry-eyed one. There is much to mourn about where we 
 
 38. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGHER EDUCATION: ISSUES 
RELATED TO LAW SCHOOL COST AND ACCESS (2007) (finding that ABA requirements play 
only a minor role in increasing law school costs). 
 39. Law professors tend to be people who would be competitive for the best law jobs. 
Between 1997 and 2007, first-year salaries at the nation’s best firms doubled from $80,000 to 
$160,000. Elizabeth G. Olson, Dewey’s Decline and the Rise of High-Risk Big Law, FORTUNE, 
May 15, 2012, available at http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2012/05/15/deweys-decline-and 
-the-rise-of-high-risk-big-law/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2013). Prospective faculty members would 
also pay attention to longer-term earning prospects. Profits per partner at the nation’s 100 
largest firms nearly doubled between 2000 and 2010, from $741,000 to $1,360,000. Id. 
Although both of these trends have moderated recently, so too have law faculty salary levels. 
 40. See LSAC Volume Summary, supra note 31. 
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find ourselves. We have always had problems with accessibility and 
affordability, especially for certain demographic groups. The shift 
from a public-goods to a private-goods perspective has aggravated 
those problems, and some of the “solutions” offered would aggravate 
them even more.
41
 In the past, because of the subsidies that resulted 
from a public-goods perspective, the vast majority of students came 
out ahead on their investment in a legal education. Now, many more 
will come out behind. Providing adequate legal services for the poor 
proved very difficult even when new lawyers had much lower debt 
levels; now it will be even more difficult. A few law schools appear 
to be continuing to operate under a public-goods model.
42
 In theory, it 
would be possible either for other schools to join them or for them to 
move to the private-goods model. I have my own sad prediction on 
which way that is likely to go. 
This perspective casts doubt on the solutions that have been 
proposed to address our current situation. Because of that, it may be 
even more pessimistic than the other perspectives offered in this 
volume and elsewhere. First, this perspective suggests that we should 
be skeptical about whether we will or can return to a world in which 
various types of subsidies will permit almost all of our students to 
come out ahead. On that issue, law schools are subject to a broad 
societal shift in how education is viewed generally. That ship has left 
port for us and for the whole educational establishment, and it is not 
coming back. Second, many of the changes that have been suggested 
to address our current situation seem to me to be very good things to 
consider—changes to curricula, to ABA standards, to the rules for 
taking bar exams, etc.
43
 But this perspective predicts that these 
 
 41. See infra note 43. 
 42. Professor Tamanaha lists them near the end of his book and describes them as flagship 
state schools with protected markets. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 184–85 
(2012). 
 43. I am more skeptical of proposals to change the federal loan guarantee program. This 
program presents a complicated set of issues. (And, of course, it is inconsistent with the broad 
thesis of this Article that we have moved to a private-goods model; this program is an example 
of continued public investment in a legal education. But it is minor in the big scheme of things.) 
Proposals to reduce the program are intended primarily as a mechanism to encourage schools to 
ameliorate tuition increases. But at the same time, limiting the program might aggravate our 
current problems in a couple ways. For example, the proposals in practice might increase 
student debt by requiring students to pay more for their legal education through alternative (and 
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changes will not have a large effect on current trends. Those trends 
are driven by changing conceptions about the value of public 
investment in legal education and, again, that ship has sailed. Finally, 
the perspective indicates that the market seems to be working roughly 
but inexorably to address these problems. The market is in the 
process right now of telling prospective students loudly and clearly 
that law school is not a sure bet anymore. Heavy pressure is being 
placed on marginal law schools with high tuition. There are fewer 
law faculty positions now, and salaries are relatively stagnant. I 
certainly believe that we can and should do what we can to soften the 
blows and make the world better. But, for better or worse, this 
perspective tells us that while all our efforts can make some small 
course corrections, the tide is very strong. 
 
more expensive) financing options. Even if the suggested changes would not do that, they 
would be likely to decrease access disproportionately for certain obvious demographic groups. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/5
